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there is no jay in the hot stench of
poverty, no colorfulness in rags and tatters, no gaiety in disease
and illiteracy, no hope in hunger, no goal to strive for, and few
personal satisfactions in life itself. For such conditions thr,re
can be, on our part, no proper mixture of sympathy of aloofnecs".
Maurice Strong,
Director General of External Aic; Office,
November 23, 1967.
Spoech iver to Women'c7 Canadlan Club
of London.
"If free civilization is to survive and grow, we
must ver y soon find vastly improved mothods for extending the benefits
of modern existene to the world community of man".
Right Honourable Lester E. Pearson,
Prime Minister of Lanada.
Speech Del ivered to the Canadian Politi
Science Association, Carleton Univorsit7,
June 85 1967.
"Despite the fact that this nced is fundamental
to the whole development process and that this field is a new and
complex one, less than one-half of 1 por cent. of the aid budgets of
donor countries is currently devoted to development research at a
time when the average growth corporation in North Aren ca spends
approximately 6 per cent of its annual income for these purposes."
Hon. Mitchell Sharp,
Secretary of State ton Externa l Affairs.
Speech-delivered in Mouse of Common,
January 12, 1970.
"The report of. the Pearson Comm;Ission idenified
an aid weariness in many donor nations I am suro the CmHission al so
encountered an aid weariness among the recipients. It is a weariness
born of being roo long a supplicant sufferino. the donor's quict arrog-
ance and his implicit denial of sovereign equality. In the cae of
research institutions that play a donor role, this recipient . ;eriness
is aggravated by a fear that the alleged benefits of colThbor6tion are
in reality illusory."
W. David Hopper, President,
International Development Pesearch Centre.
Statoment to the Inaunu.:-8.1 Meeting






A Note on Sources -
The author has had free access to all the early
documents contained in the Archival files of the Centre. For the
purposes of this work, the most important, to which extensive references
are made, are listed chronologically as fellows:
1
1) Strong, N. F., Speech delivered to Women's Canadian
Club of London, November 23, 1967.
Pearson, The Right Hon. Lester B., Speech delivered
Canadian Political Science Association, CarieLon
University, Juno B,
Plumptre, A.F.W., "Proposed International Development
Research Institution", January 24, 1968.
Report of the Steering Committee, September 3, 1952.
Papers written by members of the Steering Committee's
Task Force.
6 Hopper, D. W. "Statement to the Inaugural Meeting of
the Board of Governors of the International Development
Research Centre", Ottawa, October 26, 1970.
International Development Research Centre, Annual
Report, 1972-73,
Hopper, D. W., "Research Policy: Eleven Issues", Outline
Statement to the Board of Governors of the International
Development Research Centre at their meeting in B000ta,
Colombia, March 19, 1973.
Plumptre, A.F.N., Letter sent to Canadian Urriversity
Service Overseas with respect to Board of Governors,
February 21, 1974.
The following public sources were also consulted:
House of Commons Debates
Senate Debates
House of Commons Committee Proceedings including Minutes
of Proceedings and Evidence of-Subcommittee on International
Development Assistance
Senate Committee Proceedings.
Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons
Votes and Proceedings of the Senate
Bill C-12
In addition, the following individuals were
personally interviewed:
Hopper, W. D., President, member of the Executive Committee
and Finance Committee, International Development Research Centre
Hulse, J. H., Director, Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Sciences, International Development Resebrch Centre
Brown, G, F., Director, Population and Health Sciences,
International Development Reserch Centra
Zagorin, R. K., Director ,Social Sciences and Human
Resources, International Development Research Centre
Woolston, LI. E., Director, Information Sciences, Inter-
national Development Research Centre
Pfeifer, J. C., Secretary, International Development
Research Centre
Plumptre, A.F.W., Mcmber of Board of Governors (until 1972),
Member of Executive Committee and Finance Committee (1971-72),
Special Advisor to the President
i 8) Berle, J. G. Member of Board of Governors, Member of
Executive Committee., President of Finance Committee,
International Development Research Centre; Special
Advisor, Canadian Internetional Development Agency.
4.-1
Brecher, 1., Member of Board of Governors, Member of
Executive Committee, international Development Research
Centre; Economic Council of Canada
Oldham, G. H., Associate Director, Social Sciences and
Human Resources, International Development Research
Centre; Science Policy Research Unit, University of
Sussex.
Laguian, A. A., Associate Director, Social Sciences and
Human Resources, International Development Research Centre.
lhe author is most grateful to the ahounaled
for the generous time and interest they contributed to this work. A
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One of the most striking phenomena of the
third quarter of the Twentieth Century has been the conscious and
deliberate attempt to transform traditional societies through the
transfer of resources from affluent to poor nations. Although the
motivation for, and form of, such transfer have varied from country
to country, and over time, the basic purpose has Leen to accelerate
the economic development of the two-thirds of the world's population
afflicted by poverty and deprivation.
The historical precedents influencing the initiation
of international development assistance in the fifties were two-fold:
the termination of European colonialism and the concomitment emergence .
of newly independent nations; and, the optimism springing from the
incredible success of Marshall Plan capital assistance in restoring
the war-torn economies of Europe. Accordingly, it was hoped that the
transfer of resources could similarly stimulate economic development
in the less developed areas of the. Third World.
The concept of the importance of science and
technology to development has been a recurrent theme throughout the
history of international assistance; and has influenced the form of
transfer from developed to developing countries. Thus, in the e?rly years,
aid took the form of the transfer of capital, considered, as a resAt of the
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Marshall Plan success, to be the most important missing factor of
production in underdeveloped economies. It was hoped that, as in
the case with Europe, within a very few years aid would no longer
be required. However, this aspiration was soon proven to be un-
founded; for, whereas the peoples of Europe "had the attitudes,
motivations and institutions favourable to development"(1), the
situation was radically different in Third World countries. The
productivity of capital investment in the absence of h6man resources
was very limited.
The recognition that "the capacity of developing
countries to absorb capital effectively was sharply limited by
(2)
shortages of skills both in technical and scientific activities..." .
resulted in capital assistance being supplemented by a second form of
aid: support for educational activities, subsumed under the label of
technical assistance.
Nevertheless, impending famine at Oe dawn of the
sixties necessitated a reappraisal of the philosophy of development
assistance. Through such examination came the realization that
...embodied in the transfer campaign were the technologies of
applied science developed in and suited to the modern donor cultures;




This perspective resulted, at least in the field
of agriculture, to,the.appreciation of the need for a third type
of assistance: scientific research specifically aimed at problems
of the tropical, developing countries themselves. This does not
imply, of course, that such research had heretofore not'been under-
taken. In fact, long before the advent of development assistance
per se, the colonial powers had set up research bodies in the fields
of tropical agriculture and medicine. However, it was during the
sixties that the potential of such research began to be fully
appreciated.
The great surge of confidence during the sixties in
the infinite possibilities of the application of science and technology
to development was reflected in international interest and action
in the field. Interest was formally articulated in 1961, when the
United Nations called for a Conference on the Application of Science
and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas (UNCSAT).
The general theme was
....the challenging opportunities for accelerating
economic development through the more effective
application of existing science and technology and
through research specifically designed to produce
new app1ic4ions of special interest to less developed
countries."k4)
The Conference, in turn, set up the U.N. Advisory
Conmittee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development
(ACAST). In 1966, this Committee proposed that a World Plan of Action
/4
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for the Application of Science and Technology to Develoement'''
be formulated, and, indeed, this Plan was eventually incorporated
into the UN international Development Strategy.-°(r)
Recurrent topics of these conferences were: the
unfathomable potential of the application of science and technolooy
to devclovient; and, at th2 same time, the rejection of the idea that
developing countries should depend essentially on the transfer of
technology froir PCs. Rather, it 4as stressed that "...the obtaining
of technology from advanced countries Fnd the building up of o
scientific and technological capacity are, in fact, complimentary."(7)
This intellectual activity in the field of scicAific
research related to developing country problems was accompanied by
significant research activity and results in the sixties. Perhaps mnst
exciting J:t's the establishment, by the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations,
of d number of international agricultural research centres. The first
of these, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIEVT)
had its roots many years before in a cooperative Mexican-Rockefeller
venture. The fruits of its research activity were new high-yielding
lines of -:heat. Similarly, te International Rice Research Institute,
founded by Ford and Rockefeller in 1962 in the Phillipines, produced
new varities of rice. These drematic breakthroughs together culminated
in the well-known success of the 'Green Revolution'. Encouraged by
these results, Ford and Rockefeller, by the Iate sixties, had estblished
5
two more agricultural research centres.
Notwithstanding these developments during
the years considered, the termination of the First Development Decade
was accompanied by agonizing disappointment and disenchantment with
the results of the international aid effort. Not only had the devel-
opment gap not been narrowed, but, it had, in fact, widened. More-
over, despite the faith that had been placed in the unlimited powers
of the application of science and technology to development, the
wideningAbetween
industrialized and developing countries was perceived
mainly as a science and technology gap:
" The vv;. 1-known gap between the living standards of the less developed
countries and those of the highly developed countries has its parallel
also in science and techaolog-y; indeed the grov,ing gap between the
amount of research and application in developed and developing
countries, and between their levels of technology is one of the major
factors in the growing gap in living standards. Whether one considers
the number and equipment of research institutions or the number of
scientific and technical personnel, or the technology of production,
there is a striking contrast between the industrialized, wealthy countries
and the developing countries. One consequence of this is that only a
very small fraction of the world's scientific; and technical resources
is devoted to the problems of the developing countries; the overw'nel-
ling proportion of the world's intellectual capital, as well as its physical




More specifically, according to a study under-
taken by the 'Sussex Group', prior to the onset of the Second Develop-
ment Decade, 98 per cent of all research and development outside the
socialist world was performed by the industrialized countries, with
the developing nations contributing only 2 per cent.(9) Or, stated in
other terms, the Third World was spending, on average, only 0.2 per
cent of their GNP on research and development, as compared with be-
tween i and 3 per cent for the industrialized countries.(10) Further-
more, the situation was worsened in that research in the latter nations
was not only, in large part,irrelevant to developing world needs, but
was in some cases (e.g. synthetics), actually detrimental.
Moreover, even in cases of highly significant
research results - for example, the high yielding strains of wheat and
Ct
rice - there was evidence of,task not completed:
I I ... the approach taken in agriculture focused
primarily on enhancing food availability. The
research teams concentrated on the identifiable
technical barriers to greater output and undertook
to overcome or circumvent them. In doing so, they
implicitly or explicitly ignored many of the social
and economic consequences of providing the technical
base for a dynamic agriculture that meshed readily
with the foundations of a growing national economy.
In other words, the single purpose focus on production
research neglected the many other complementary com-
ponents that,comprise the totality of a national
agriculture.01)
Growing awareness of this dearth of research
relevant to developing country needs led to the conclusion that the
/7
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panacea for development lay not merely in the transfer of science
and technology. Rather, in the philosophy for the Second Development
Decade, the concept of the necessity of an indigenous scientific
and technological capacity was re4nforced. Moreover, it was stressed
that indigenous research should be geared towards the needs of the
developing countries, and be of a practical, or applied, nature.
Once the case for a fundamental 1.7search and training (..;lernent in the
national structure of all developing con.ntr Les has been recognized, the general
principle of an orientation in this stru,:ture to'Nards local problenis should be
recognized. In general the scarce resources available, especially at the earlier
stages of development, will be more efre,:tively used by beinf!, spe.citically
oriented towards application. Where fun,..tarnental research is done, it should
be as runch as possible related tr) specjics. national problems, rather than
.wo:k done elsewhere, (12)
Finally, it was deemed important that such research should be inter-
disciplinary, in order to mitigate economic, political, and social
problems created by the infusion of new technologies, as had been
evidenced with respect to the new wheat and rice varieties.
Thus, through the evolution of philosophical concepts
related to international development assistance, the stage had been
prepared for development research, and a new style of aid. The first
organization to be established for the purpose of supporting research
activities as defined by developing countries perceptions of research
priorities, and, at the same time, to develop indigenous
/8
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scientific and technological capability, was the International
Development Research Centre, established in Canada at the commencement
of the seventies. Because the Centre's style represents a truly
innovative contribution to development assistance, it is the purpose
of this paper to examine the nature of the organization, and to delve
into the history of its formation.
/9
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An Overview of the International Deve1opment2fsearch Centre
The International Development Research
Centre, established in May 1970 with the passage of an Act of the
Canadian Parliament, is a public corporation characterized by
political independence and financial freedom and flexibility un-
precedented in the international scene. The most striking evidence
of the Centres independence is inherent in the international
character of the Board of GovérnorS, consisting of 21 members, 10 of
whom are non-Canadians (including six from the developing countries).
The flexibility and freedom of the Centre are exemplified by its
financial arrangements. As a public rather than a government agency,
the Centre enjoys two advantages: firstly, annual appropriations do
not lapse, but can be accumulated; and, secondly, because the Centre
does not fall under the Financial Administration Act, it is not bound
by Treasury Board regulations.
The raison d'etre of the Centre, as outlined
in the corporate objects of the Act, is "....to initiate, encourage,
support and conduct research into the problems of the developing
regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting
.scientific, technical and other knowledoe to the economic and social




to enlist the talents of natural and social
scientists and technologists of Canada and
other countries;
to assist the developing regions to build up
the research capabilities, the innovative
skills and the institutions required to solve
their problems;
to encourage generally the coordination of inter-
national development research; and
to foster cooperation in research on development
problems between the developed and developing
regions for their mutual benefit."(1)
With respect to the introductory broad
statement of purpose, the Centre undertakes to encourage and support
research - focused on science and technology - into the problems of
developing regions. In popular jargon, this is referred to as
"developmental research". Moreover, in the quest for direct solutions
to specific development problems, the Centre has maintained "a strong
orientation to assisting research that has a practical, or an applied,
significance for the economic and social advancement of developing
nations."(2)
The 1972-73 Annual Report of the Centre states
that "particular pride of place" has been given to objective (b): for,
"in major measure, Centre support has focused on building the research
skills of scientists and technologists in the developing countries".(3)
This emphasis on the "indigenization of research", as it was apparently
once coined by Rex Nettleford, reflects the outstanding and unique
style of the Centre's operations.
- 13 -
The philosophical bias towards concentration
on implementation of objective (b) has several implications for
policy: Firstly, the Centre endeavours to place strong emphasis on
acceptance of, and support for, project priorities as defined by the
developing countries themselves, rather than through an enthnocentric
exercise of Centre judgement as to the "proper" priorities. Secondly,
the Centre has focused support on researchers indigenous to the
developing regions, involving Western scientists only when there is a
clear advantage in doing so. Thirdly, in addition to support for the
finding of solid research results of "international standard",
("product-oriented" research), the Centre recognizes the great im-
portance of "process-oriented" research, i.e. the provision of on-
the-job research opportunities and training for the LDC research
scientists and technologists. These three policy issues are subsumed
under the Centre's central ideal of "responsiveness" to LDC requirements;
or, in colloquial terms, the ideal of research in for, and initiated
and executed by the developing countries.
Objective (a) - the enlistment of the talents
of natural and social scientists and technologists of Canada and other
countries - has been mplemented in as much as an international staff
has been recruited and competence has been sought throughout the world.
Wherever possible, staff has been recruited from the LDCs. Otherwise,




Objective (d) - with its emphasis on mutual
benefit for developed (especially Canada) and developing countries -
can better be phrasedas the element of mutual cooperation. Mutual
benefit implies that research activities be Undertaken to solve
problems common to Canada and the developing countries. This is
clearly not the case. The Centre's pre-eminent concern is with
problems of the developing countries. Although there are examples
of project results which could have relevance for Canada, the possibility
of spin-off and mutual benefit is not a criterion for selection of pro-
jects. The aspect of mutual cooperation, on the other hand, is im-
portant in the Centre's operations. The solution of certain LDC
problems - especially in the "hard" sciences - requires a substantial
amount of "basic" research to support the specific, applied research
undertaken in the LDCs. This "basic" research can often best be done
in a developed country such as Canada, where the scientific infra-
structure already exists. In this way, the Centre taps Canadian
expertise in dealing with developing country priorities.
Finally, objective (c), the co-ordination of
international development research, has been operationalized along
three dimensions of the Centre's activities. Firstly, there is the
concern with the establishment of international information and data
banks. The Centre's role is to support cooperative initiatives in
the United Nations family, devoting particular attention to ensuring
that developing countries are able to exploit the banks to meet their
/1 5
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needs. The Centre has no substantial inhouse activity in this area,
concentrating rather on using its flexibility and dynamism to initiate,
support, or improve the facilities of large, established, international
bodies. The second dimension of the Centre's coordinating activities
is the organization of "research networks" in the developing countries.
This is a truly innovative mechanism by which LDC researchers from
different developing countires are brought together to discuss, in
work-shop fashion, problems of common interest. Through the networks,
a dual purpose is realized: (a) the coordination of research efforts
in several developing countries, thus preventing the duplication of
results, and (b) the creative opportunity for LDC researchers to
clarify and articulate their priorities through a concerted effort.
Thirdly, in order to minimize duplication of efforts, close informal
links are maintained with other donor agencies. (4) In addition,
the Centre plays an important coordinating and innovating role in the
international agricultural research centres located in the developing
countries.
In order to placea manageable limitation on
the broad, overall purpose of supporting research into the problems
of developing countries, activities have so far been restricted to
four programme areas: Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Sciences,
Information Sciences, Population and Health Sciences, and Social
Sciences and Human Resources. The cumulative total program projects
approved as of March 31st, 1974 indicate that the greatest percentage
/16
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of the Centre's funds are devoted to Agriculture, Food and Nutrition
Sciences (38.3%), followed by Social Sciences and Human Resources
(29.4%), Population and Health Sciences (19.7%), and,
lastly, Information Sciences (12.6%).
The rationale underlying the selection of
each of the programme areas is not difficult to uncover. Firstly,
despite the major breakthroughs of the Green Revolution, the reality,
etny,--vn.terrte-yei-e" te6 1-4e,/
of starving millions still persisted at the
AL4AL4-4-i-e.4
Moreover, malnutrition, which is to great extent a
matter of ignorance and inappropriate food habits, is "... a more
serious scourge to mankind even than hunger." (5) Consequently, a
fundamental need for increased research in the area of agriculture,
food, and nutrition sciences was perceived. Secondly, it was deemed
crucial that research be undertaken in the field of population lest
agricultural advances be outdistanced by the rate of population growth.
Thirdly, in the area of social sciences, little rsearch, especially
of an applied nature, had been undertaken. The lesson of social and
economic problems in Mexico with relation to new crop technologies
had suggested the need forAcomprehensive, inter-disciplinary approach
to research. Finally, growing concern with the lack of co-ordination
of international research efforts and the inaccessability of research




To further narrow the Centre's breadth of
concerns, the predominant focus is on research to improve the well-
being of rural peoples, both farm and non-farm. This choice
made on two grounds: firstly, the greater part of the population of
developing countries is located in the rural areas; and, secondly,
it is the people living outside the relatively modernized, urban
areas who are most directly affected by change and development.
Even such a cursory overview of the philosophy
and early operations of the IDRC ignites the imagination to pose
several questions. Firstly, through the inspiration of which in-
dividuals, and in what philosophical medium, did the concept of
the Centre take root and evolve? Secondly, what was the qenesis
of such elements as independence, internationalism, flexibility,
developmental research in science and technology, coordination, and
responsiveness?; and when and why did other ideas, such as mutual
benefit, languish along the path? Thirdly, how, in operational
terms, does the Centre currently function? For example, to what
extent can the Centre achieve the ideal of responsiveness, i.e., its
orientation to research in, for, and initiated and executed by the
developing countries. Finally, in what ways has the Centre's unique
style affected the international community?
In order to answer these fundamental questions,
it is necessary to examine the evolution of the IDRC, from its earliest
germination in 1967 to the present date. For purposes of clarity and
/18
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and elaboration, the evolution of ideas is considered below in
four distinct, but overlapping phases. Phase I identifies the
earliest germination of ideas in the minds of Maurice Strong and
The Right Hon. Lester B. Pearson. Phase II considers the activities
and philosophy of the Steering Committee established by Cabinet.
Included in the activities of the Committee are the Plumptre
feasibility study, and the establishment of a supporting Task Force.
Phase III discusses the drafting the legislation, and its journey
through Cabinet, the House of Commons, and the Senate. Phase IV, con-
sisting of three parts, describes the vision of David Hopper, and its
implementation. Part A outlines Hopper's proposals and considers the
mechanism involved in fulfilling the ideal of responsiveness. Parts
B and C are devoted to the Centres senior staff and Board of Governors
respectively. Finally, a concluding section speculates as to what
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Phase I - Earliest Germination of Ideas
. Maurice Strong, presently Executive
Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, spent his
childhood in humble circumstances. Having finished High School,
he made a conscious decision to defer going to University and
subsequently embarked on a career which was to startle his con-
tempories.
Strong's background reflects a mixture of
business, travel, and humanitarian interests. Highly successful as
a financial anflyst and executive in the business world, , by
his mid thirties, the President of Power Corporation of Canada
.Limited, and an officer or director of some thirty other Canadian
and international corporations. His humanitarian interest in de-
velopment was nurtured by three significant experiences: firstly,
in his formative years, Strong was greatly influenced by his encounters
with missionaries in Sunday School, and, at a later time, he became
involved with lay preaching; secondly, during his late teens
was employed for several months by the Hudson's Bay Company, and worked
closely with Canadian eskimos; thirdly, during the years 1952 and 1953
he immersed himself in world-wide travels, (including one year in East
Africa), and during this period became involved with the international
Young Men's Cristian Association (YMCA).
/21
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Upon returning to Canada, Strong had no
intention of reasserting himself in the business world; rather, his
desire was to become involved in development. Accordingly, he pre-
sented himself at the External Aid Office, but, ironically, was
turned away due to his lack of academic qualifications. Undaunted,
decided to return to business, using his success as a platform
for eventual eligibility to enter the development field.
Such an opportunity presented itself when,
in 1966, the External Aid Office was seeking new leadership. So
sincere and profound 'vas Strong's commitment to the eradication of
global poverty that, when invited by Paul Martin to head the latter
organization, he gave up his profitable business concerns and
entered the development forum.
*
Emerging from this business background, Strong
held strongly to the view that any respectable and viable corporation
spends at least five or six per cent of its total annual sales on
research and development. Therefore, regarding the business of
development to be a crucial world concern, he expected that substantial
sums were being devoted to research on problems of development. Con-
sequently, on assuming the Directorship of the External Aid Office in




During his travels, Strong had become
very impressed with the research work of the private bodies (e.g.
Ford and Rockefeller), which governmental agencies did not appear
to be able, or willing, to do. This favourable impression was
o
reinforced in early 1967, when visited India and met David
Hopper, one of the fathers of the Green Revolution. Excited and
ignited both by the success of Rockefeller's research efforts and
by Hopper's enthusiasm, Strong returned to Ottawa with the concern
as to how Canada could become as innovative as the private organizations
in establishing research programmes.
The question immediately arose as to where
the research effort should take place. The unsuitability of CIDA
soon became apparent. Because Strong believed that it was desirable
for the aid agency to be considered an influencial component of over-
all policy formulation, it was therefore necessary that CIDA remain a
government agency. However, such a policy, of necessity, meant lack
of political freedom and flexibility. Accordingly, Strong conceived
the necessity for a separate body to assume the research function.
He envisioned a politically independent organization, with a high
degree of flexibility, unconstrained by the bureaucratic and political
forces at work in CIDA. Believing that the real gap in development
was in research, and seeing to-day's research as tomorrow's develop-
ment; Strong perceived thei,s;nstitute's main role as research into
/23
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the application or adaptation of the newly-evolving technologies
of the industrialized. countries to the problems of the developing
countries. Moreover, because he suspected that Canada's lack of
development research was common to other countries as well, he
foresaw the organization as serving not only the Canadian,but also
the world need for research. Although Strong was not married, at
this time, to any one particular concept as to how such research
should be undertaken, he imagined that it would take place in a
Canadian centre, but in a centre with firm links with institutions
and expertise in the developing worI4,
In the spring of 1967, Strong discussed
his brainchild with the Honourable .Paul Martill, who then took an
early opportunity to raise the matter with The Right Honourable
Lester B. Pearson. The Prime Minister, however, emersed at that
time in problems of Government expenditure, reacted oaely, apparently
feeling that Canadian external aid was-already too high. However, with
N4oaq&t
the assistance of Lady Barbara Ward Jackson, who with great
enthusiasm to the Strong proposal, Martin reopened the question
with Mr. Pearson, who, on this occasion, reacted favourably.
In a speech delivered to the Canadian
Political Science Association at Carleton University, the Prime
Minister made the first public mention of the proposed research
centre. In this speech, Pearson portrayed an institution which
/24
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could bring to bear the fruits of technology to development:
"The rapidly advancing technology and
the complex interrelationships of to-day's global
society demand that the fundamental problems of man
be dealt with on an international and an interprofessional
basis...One idea for a new Canadian initiative in meeting
this challenge....is for the establishment of a Centre
of International Development." (2)
Interestingly, both Mr. Pearson and those individuals in the media
who later publicized the idea.presented the concept of a 'think-tank',
consisting of an international group of experts from a variety of
disciplines working together in one centre to find solutions to the
problems of development.
In addition to the focus on developmental
research in science and technology, both Strong and Pearson conceived
an important role of the organization in the area of the coordination
of information. The issue of information had always been one of
Pearson's priority concerns. Moreover, if the research gap between
developed and developing countries was to be reduced, it was deemed
crucial by both Strong and Pearson that the developing nations should
have ready access to the results of the total international research
in the area of development. Consequently, they were hopeful of the
new organization developing a large, inhouse, developmental literature
data-bank, to which the entire development community, including the
developing countries, would have ready access.
During this same period, in the excitement
and ambiance of Expo '67, several other individuals besides Strong
and-Pearson were -making proposals to continue the spirit of inter-
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nationalism that the World's Fair had sparked in Canada. On July-
4, 1967, a number of these, together with the proposal for the
the international research institute, were submitted to Cabinet
by the Hon. Paul Martin, Secretary of State for External Affairs.
The reaction to the Strong/Pearson concept was favourable, as
indicated by the August 11 recommendation that a Steering Committee
be established to consider the proposal in greater detail.
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Phase II - The Activities and Philosophy of the Steering Committee
The Steering Committee, under the Chairman-
ship of Maurice Strong, was composed of an impressive membership of
senior public servants; including the heads of seventeen departments
and agencies.(1) As such, the group represented the 'Establishment'
in Ottawa. Predictably, then, the Committee's reaction, and, indeed,
its task, was to take a critical view of such an extraordinary new
proposal. There was considerable skepticism with respect to two
issues: firstly, mas the need for development research critical
enough that it should take priority over alternative uses of
Canadian tax money. More specifically, there was concern that the
organization might absorb funds required for educational needs in
Canadian universities;-and, secondly, would the Canadian institution
be duplicating the efforts of other bodies in the world? In short,
was there an "international basis" for the proposed institution? In
order to allay or confirm this skepticism, the Steering Committee
decided that an independent feasibility study be undertaken. For
this purpose, two Toronto Principals were recommended: A.F.W. Plufflptre
of Scarborough College, and D.V. LePan of University-College. Both
Plumptre and LePan had long experience in the public service and an
interest in aid. As LePan was engaged in other activities at the
time, Plumptre was invited to undertake the feasibility study.
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In order to assess whether there was an
"international basis" for the proposed institution and, if so,
what implications this might have for the institution itself,
Plumptre had conversations not only with Canadian officials, but
, also with officers of international and national bodies in the U.S.,
Britain, and France. The resultant Plumptre report of January 24,
1968 is summarized briefly below.
As a result of his discussions, Plumptre
verified that there was indeed an international basis for the pro-
posed research institute in Canada. He concluded that "the .need
for research in the field under consideration is world-wide and
urgent."(2) In addition, he discovered that the fear of the
possibility of duplication was unfounded. On the contrary, he was
assured that "the world is very short of research in some of the
fields we are considering."(3) Moreover, it was not implied in
any of the conversations that Canadian funds might better "be
contributed to some existing research centre, or added to the
Canadian bilateral aid programme, or donated to I.D.A.(4) In fact,
it was suggested that Canada had several advantages in this field of
research not enjoyed by other industrialized countries.
Having established the need for the Canadian
organization, Mr. Plumptre then investigated the Strong/Pearsonian
conceptions of (a) research into science and technology, (b) the
think-tank operation, and (c) the data-bank role.
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Firstly, with respect to the type of
research that the Centre should do, there was great support for
Strong's proposal of research into the "application or adaptation
of the newly-evolving technologies of the industrialized countries
to the problems and possibilities of the developing countries."(5)
Secondly, in discussions of the think-tank
operation, the Psonian concept was considerably altered. Plumptre
observed that there was "unanimous opposition to the idea that the
research operations.... should be gathered together into a single
"centre" - (and housed, as-at least one enthusiast has proposed,
under one vast plastic dome!)"
(6)
Rather, it was felt that research
should be, to a considerable extent, carried out in the developing
countries themselves; or, if in Canada, in industry or universities
where research facilities already existed.
Thirdly, in investigating the concept of
a data-bank role for the organization, Plumptre encountered marked
skepticism. There was a general feeling that "data-banking and pro-
cessing should grow slowly out of and be associated with an operating
programme,"(7) rather than there being a substantial computer element
in the project from the outset.
Finally, in addition to investigatino the
three conceptions above, Plumptre's report also introduced the con-
cept of "mutual benefit". The basic objective, he concluded, "should
/30
-30-
be to develop research that responded to the needs of developing
countries and which at the same time had application to Canadian
experience and Canadian problems.8) As such, he felt it would
enlarge and enrich Canadian research experience, while, at the
same time, strengthening Canadian universities and assisting
Canadian academics.
*
The Plumptre report h d significant input
in two respects. Firstly, and most important, the study alleviated
the Steering Committee's skepticism with respect to the international-
basis of the proposed institution. This was evidenced by the Committee's
submission to Cabinet on September 3, 196E, recommending the establish-
ment of the Centre. Secondly, as outlined above, Plumptre also made
suggestions which somewhat altered the previous Strong/Pearsonian
conceptions as to what the organization should do. As will be dis-
cussed below, some of these suggestions were articulated in the Report
of the Steering Committee.
The Steering Committee Report described
the institute as a Canadian sponsored, independent, non-profit
organizatton with an international character-. The independence,
however, was to be accompanied by close informal relations with
/31
- 31 -
External Aid and other government agencies. Moreover, as Strong
had conceived, it would be designed to undertake research in science
and technology into the problems of developing countries.
The medium for organizing such research
was Pearson's "think-tank" operation, referring to the process of
"policy research". This would involve the assimilation and
analysis of data related to particular issues, the development and
evaluation of various policy alternatives, and their presentation
in usable form to the decision-makers. Largely as a result of
Plumptre's input, the original concept of research activity taking
place in one Centre was modified to include the contracting out of
research, both to institutions in developing countries and to
universities and industry in Canada. The Centre's role would be to define
the developing country priorities for developmental research, to initiate
research activities, and to co-ordinate efforts in Canada and abroad.
There was no stated belief, in this Report, that priorities should
be defined, and activities initiated, by the LDCs themselves. It was
hoped that the new institute could play the role for developing
countries that the U.S. Rand and Hudson bodies were filling for de-
veloped countries.
ia-C4
Despite the that Plumptre had
encountered with respect to data-banking, this role was much aphasized
in the Steering Committee Report. No doubt there was considerable
pressure from the Strong/Pearson caucns not only for political
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reasons (information was an important national concern at the time),
but also because there was a serious gap in international data
collection, and consequently a hope that the Canadian organization
would fill this gap.
The element of mutual benefit, which had
been introduced by Plumptre, was reflected as exceedingly important
in the Report. In fact, the institute was portrayed as having a
dual role: an International Development Role, and a Domestic Role,
involving research into problems having relevance for both Canada
and the developing regions. It was the main thesis of the Report
that both interests could be preserved and enhanced by combining
them into one international Centre, It was expected that whereas
the International role would be one of initiation of activities,
the separate Domestic division would be responsive to Canadian
requests. The importance of mutual benefit, with the inclusion of
a separate Domestic Division, reflected the general interest of the
Establishment in catering to Canadian needs. However, it has been
suggested that a more specific motive may have been involved. At
the time, the possibility of the establishment of a new 'Brookings
Institution' type organization for economic policy research into
Canadian problems was being investigated by R. S. Ritchie. The
latter recommended the organization on the grounds that it would
fill the need for domestic research that the Economic Council of
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Canada was not undertaking. Therefore, it is said that the Steering
Committee included in their proposed institution the Domestic Role
in order to divert the government from establishing an additional
research body.
The above discussion outlines the basic
strategy recommended by the Steering Committee for the new institute.
The Committee agreed that the submission to Cabinet and later to
Parliament would have to include a sample of initial work programs.
To formulate such a sample, Strong instructed Stuart Peters, Special
Advisor at CIDA and Coordinator for the proposed institute, to
invite interested Canadian professional people to offer suggestions for
research undertakings that seemed to them likely to be relevant to
the Centre's purposes. The members of this loosely structured Task
Force made proposals with respect to a number of areas of activity.(9)
The Report of the Steering Committee, supported
with sample papers written by the Task Force, was submitted to Cabinet
on September 3, 1968, at which point The Right Hon. Pierre Elliott
Trudeau and the Hon. Mitchell Sharp had replaced the Pearson-Martin
team. The Throne Speech of September 12, 1968 indicated the new
Government's intention to proceed with the legislation. Finally, on
December 17, 1968, a Cabinet Directive 'gave approval in principie
to the proposed institute, subject to detailed consideration of the
legislation. The time had now come for the formal drafting of the
legislation, and Phase III of the evolution of the IDRC.
/34
Reference and Notes
1. Membership of the Steering Committee established under



















Deputy Minister of Transport
Deputy Minister of Finance
Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs
Secretary of Treasury Board
Deputy Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs
Chairman Canadian Section,




Deputy Minister, Department of
Energy, Mines and Resources
Deputy Minister, Department of
Manpower and Immigration
- Governor, Bank of Canada
Deputy Minister of Industry
Clerk of the Privy Council and
Secretary to the Cabinet
Under-Secretary of State
Deputy Clerk of the Privy Council
and Deputy Secretary to the
Cabinet
Deputy Minister of Trade & Commerce
Director, Science Secretariat,
Privy Council
Deputy Minister of Welfare
Deputy Minister of Agriculture Canada
Plumptre, A.F.W., "Proposed International Development
Research Institution", January 24, 1968, International








The Task Force did not generally act as a uni.t. In
fact, only one meeting of the members was held,
organized by Plumptre at Scarborough College. The
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Phase III - Drafting of the Legislation, and its Journey through
Cabinet, House of Commons, and Senate
In March 1969, a drafting team was assembled
under the direction and guidance of Maurice Strong. The team originally
consisted of three full-time members: Stuart Peters, CIDA's coordinator
for the research institute, Geoffrey Oldham, senior research fellow of
the Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, and Earl Doe;(1)
and two part-time members: Irving Brecher, Director of the Centre for
Developing Area Studies, McGill University, and D. Wilson of the Science
Council. As coordinator, Peters was an individual of enterprising,
energetic skills, and played an important role during this formative
period.
By June 30, 1959, draft legislation had been
prepared, and was attached to the final memorandum to Cabinet. The
memorandum was approved by Cabinet, and the draft legislation sent
to the Minister of Justice in order to translate it into legal language.
James Pfeifer, a Department of Justice draftsman with an interest in
international law, and formerly legal _adviser at CIDA, was chosen to
undertake the task. In September 1969, the final legislation was
presented before two Cabinet committees: External Affairs and Science
and Technology.
During this drafting period of six months,
Maurice Strong had an extremely influential input with respect to
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three issues: political independence, financial flexibility, and
the information role of the "International Development Research
Centre of Canada", as it was now titled.
Partly as a result of earlier frustrations
with CIOA, or, more specifically, concern with the occasional influence
of parochial considerations causing delay, Strong was eager to create
an organization as politically and financially independent as was
conceivably possible considering it was to be a government organ-
ization funded by Canadian tax money. Therefore, with the help of
James Pfeifer, a truly innovative corporation was created. The
resulting species was a public corporation, structured very loosely
on the form of existing corporations such as the National Arts Centre
or Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. The corporation created was not
to be considered part of the public service, not to be taxable, not
to be subject to Treasury Board rules, and not to be subject to certain
extremely important sections of the Financial administration which
governed all departments and corporations of the public structure.*
The acceptance of such a corporation by the Department of Justice and
the Treasury Board was the result of the influence of Maurice Strong,
and a work of legal art on the part of Pfeifer. Moreover, it should
be recognized that such acceptance was a reflection also of the
favourable, though not indiscriminate, disposition of several officials




mainly due to concern for the needs of Quebec, and, therefore,
opposition to funds being spent otherwise.
Strong was also concerned that the idea
of information and data-banking remain significant in the Centre's
operations. This stress was apparent in the overall statement of
purpose of the Act, with its reference to the application and
adaptation of "knowledge", and in the first "power" of the Act,
permitting the Centre to
"establish, maintain and operate information and
data centres and facilities for research and other
activities relevan to its object."
During the Cabinet journey, the legislation
embodied three of the four objects ultimately included in the Act:
to enlist the talents of natural and social
scientists and technologists of Canada and
other countries
to assist those regions to develop the scientific
research capabilities and innovative skills
required to solve their problems
to further scientific and technological cooperation
in economic and social development between the
economically developed and underdeveloped regions
for their mutual benefit.
Objective (c) clearly reflects that the
concept of mutual benefit, first encountered during the Steering
Committee stage, had stood the test of time. It was particularly
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important to Irving Brecher and Stuart Peters, who felt that it was
crucial both to tap and augment Canadian resources in development.
To the other team members, it was considered useful from the point of
view of getting it through Parliament.
Interestingly, the think-tank concept,
although undoubtedly still in the mind of Pearson and others, was
not articulated in the three objects of the Centre, Rather, the
objects were subject to wide interpretation and clearly not limited
to the earlier Rand or Hudson type concept.
There was considerable discussion amongst
the members of the drafting team as to whether Parliamentarians would
accept the notion of the Centre transferring most of its resources
to the developing regions, which the implementation of objective (b)
would no doubt involve. However, Oldham's personal background in
developing countries made him an advocate of promoting technological
self-reliance, and the objective was finally incluc!ed. It is
significant to note that the inclusion of the objective was the first
articulation of the concept of promoting IN self-reliance.
On October 29, 1969, the legislation to
establish the IDRC of Canada was introduced in the House of Commons.
On january 12, 1970, the Honourable Mitchell Sharp moved that the
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Bill be read a second time and be referred to the Standing Committee
on External Affairs and.National Defence. This Committee delegated
authority to the Sub-Committee on International Development Assist-
ance to consider the legislation in detail. The Standing Committee
then reported back to- the House of Commons which gave its final
approval.
At the time of the second reading of the
Bill, Mr, Sharp in his speech reinforced the concept of the promotion
of technological capability in the LDCs, which had first been artic-
ulated in the drafting of the legislation. Apparently, Mr. Sharp's
speech was drafted by Maurice Strong, .so that it is reasonable to
assume that the following quotatior reflected Strong's as well as
Mr. Sharp's philosophy with respect to th2 Centre's role:
"It will give high priority to programs that assist
the developing countries to build their own scientific
and technological capabilities so that they wi11 not
be mere welfare recipients, 'out contributors in their
own right to the solution of their own problems."(2)
During the activities of the Subcommittee,
the need for more coordinated effort with respect to the availability
of developmental information was repeatedly stressed. In his test-
imony, Maurice Strong stressed that "... one of the best pay offs
that you can get from a Centre like this would be in helping
less developed countries to get and make use of existing information
(3'in various fields of science and technology and in avoiding duplication."
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This need was deemed important enough to include a fourth object:
'to encourage generally the coordination of
international development research'.
The inclusion of an additional object
added weight to the two other legislative references to information
discussed above. The data-bank role was seen as an essential
mechanism for coordinating research, and a crucial resource in de-
velopment.
A second amendment made riuring the Subcomittee
stage was the deleting of the words"of Canada" from the institute's
title. It was felt that the inclusion of the words would have a
detrimental impact on an otherwise "international" organization. The
corporation ras to be called the "International Development Research
Centre."
The third and final amendment made in the
House of Commons vas the provision of a clause permitting one of the
Governors of the Centre to be a Parliamentarian. Interestingly, Mr.
Sharp made it clear that he would not enforce the appointment of a
Parliamentarian to the Board of Governors.
In March, 1970, the Bill was introduced
into the Senate by Senator Martin, and, according to usual procedure,
was referred to the Standing Senate Committee. on Foreign Affairs.
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Following amendments with respect to the number of governors who
could be appointed from the House of Commons or the Sentate (one
changed to two), and regarding the Income Tax and Estate Tax Acts,
the Committee reported back to the Senate, which approved the Bill
as amended.
* * *





After a short time, Doe was pulled away from the
mainstream of activities, and devoted his time
to the aspect of information.
Sharp, The Hon. Mitchell, Speech on International
Development Research Centre, Delivered in the House
of Commons, January 12th, 1970.
Strong, Maurice, Testimony before Subcommittee on
International Development Assistance, Issue #13 of
the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the
Committee (External Affairs and National Dafence).
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Hopefully, the positive impression that
IDRC appears to be making on both recipients and other donor agencies
can concurrently assist in the alleviation of aid weariness. Only
through such an alleviation can a partnership between developed and
developing countries be created, which "replaces fear with trust,
suspicious withdrawal by eager collaboration"P)
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